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Good Cause for Franchise Termination: An 
Irreconcilable Difference Between Franchisee 
Fault and Franchisor Market Withdrawal? 
Once limited t o  the fast-food and hotel industries, franchis- 
ing is now big business in the United States. Collectively, fran- 
chise outlets employ more than 7.2 million people and sell 
approximately $600 billion annually in goods and services.' In 
1990 franchises accounted for thirty-four percent of retail sales 
in the United  state^.^ The number of franchise outlets has 
grown from approximately 200,000 in 1960 to approximately 
465,000 in 1990.~ These figures reflect the significant role 
franchising now plays in our national economy reform, a role 
which has led to statutory reform. 
Until the mid-1970s, common law contract doctrine gov- 
erned the franchisor-franchisee relationship. The franchisor 
could lawfully terminate the franchise relationship when the 
franchise contract expired or when the fraachisee breached any 
contractual pro~ision.~ Termination essentially caused the 
franchisee to forfeit her investment, except for equipment, 
supplies, and inventory that had already been purchased, and 
it allowed the franchisor to regain full control of the fran~hise.~ 
Moreover, the franchisee was not compensated for the value of 
her business, while the franchisor was free to begin a relation- 
ship with a new franchisee. 
The application of common law contract doctrine to fran- 
chise agreements was modified during the 1970s as allegations 
1. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, l O l S I '  CONG., 2~ SESS., 
FRANCHISING IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 111 (Comm. Print 
Sept. 1990). 
2. Franchising in the U S .  Economy: Hearing Before the House Comm. on 
Small Business, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1990). By 2000, franchising is expected 
to account for half of all retail sales. Id. at  97-98. 
3. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 1OlSI' CONG., 2D SESS., 
FRANCHISING IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 6, 16 (Comm. Print 
Sept. 1990). 
4. See Ernest Gellhorn, Limitations of Contract Termination Rights-Franchise 
Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 466. 
5. Id. at 467 n.5. 
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of franchisor abuse reached legislators' receptive ears? Many 
states enacted legislation7 to correct the perceived disparity in 
bargaining power between franchisors and franchisees and to 
prevent unjust enrichment of the franchi~or.~ These franchise 
relationship statutes allow termination only for "good," '?just," 
or "reasonable" cause, which is generally defined as the 
franchisee's failure to reasonably or substantially comply with 
the terms of the franchise agreement.g Thus, the good cause 
standard has taken away the franchisor's unilateral right to 
determine its franchisee's compliance with the agreement and 
has placed the burden on the judiciary to resolve what consti- 
tutes satisfactory performance by the franchisee. 
This comment examines the impact of the good cause stan- 
dard on two areas of termination litigation: franchisee failure 
6. Legislative hearings revealed such abuses by franchisors as refusal to renew 
viable franchises, leaving the franchisee with nothing for her investment. "Others 
have threatened franchisees with termination to coerce them to stay open a t  
unreasonable hours, purchase supplies only from the franchisor and a t  excessive 
rates or unduly expand their facilities." Westfield Centre Serv. v. Cities Serv. Oil 
Co., 432 A.2d 48, 53 (N.J. 1981). 
7. Currently 20 jurisdictions have statutes governing franchise termination. See 
ARK. CODE ANN. $8 4-72-202(7), -204(a)(l) (Michie 1991); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
$ 20,020 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. $ 42-133f(a) (West 1987); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, $ 2552(a) (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. $5 29-1201(7), -1203 (1991); HAW. 
REV. STAT. $ 482E-6(H) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 1719 (Smith- 
Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.7-l(7) (Burns 1989); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. $ 445.1527(c) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. 80C.l4(b) (West Supp. 
1992); MISS. CODE ANN. $ 75-24-53 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.405 (Vernon 
1990); NEB. REV. STAT. $8 87-402(8), -404 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. $ 56:lO-5 (West 
1989); TENN. CODE ANN. $9 47-25-1502(4), -1503, -1504 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE 
ANN. 13.1-564 Wichie 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 19.100.180(i) (West 1989); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. $5 135.02(4), -.03 (West 1989); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, $8 278(d), 
-278a (1976); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12A, 2-132 (1979). Arkansas, California, the 
District of Columbia, Illinois, Michigan, M i ~ e s o t a ,  T e ~ e s s e e ,  Washington, and 
Wisconsin also require that the franchisee have an opportunity to cure a breach 
before termination. 
Even if a state does not have a general franchise law, it  may have legislation 
governing automobile, gasoline, liquor, or farm implement dealerships. See Ray- 
mond King, Comment, Fairness in Franchising: The Need for a Good Cause Termi- 
nation Requirement in California, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 780, 803 n.100 (1980). 
8. See generally A.B.A. ANTITRUST SIX., MONOGRAPH NO. 17, FRANCHISE 
PROTECTION: LAWS AGAINST TERMINATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL 
FRANCHISES (1990) (discussing the need for legislative intervention in franchise 
relationships). 
9. Statutes in Arkansas, California, Co~ec t icu t ,  the District of Columbia, Ha- 
waii, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, T e ~ e s s e e ,  
Washington, Wisconsin, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands follow this definition. 
Virginia and Delaware do not define good cause, and Mississippi and Missouri do 
not have a good cause requirement for termination. See supra note 7. 
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to comply with the financial terms of the agreement and fran- 
chisor market withdrawal. Section I1 considers how a statutory 
good cause definition protects the franchisee following the 
franchisee's breach. Section I11 presents a case study of an area 
generally outside statutory good causefranchisee termination 
resulting from a change in the franchisor's marketing 
strategy-and demonstrates how termination legislation consid- 
ers only the interests of the franchisee. Section IV concludes 
that the state legislatures should reconsider their franchise 
termination legislation by recognizing and protecting the le- 
gitimate interests of both the franchisor and franchisee. 
11. FRANCHISEE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
FINANCIAL TERMS 
Without referring to a state franchise statute, a franchisor 
may assume that its franchisee's failure to comply with the fi- 
nancial terms of the agreement, such as reporting sales accu- 
rately or paying royalties on time, constitutes sufficient 
grounds for termination without violating the state's good 
cause statute. However, depending upon the statutory good 
cause definition, this assumption may not be confirmed by a 
court, as the following cases show. This section examines how 
the judiciary applies the good cause standard by focusing on 
the relationship between the parties' conduct, the good cause 
definition, and public policy. 
A. Indiana's Hacienda Case: 
No Shelter for the Franchisee 
In Hacienda Mexican Restaurant of Kalamazoo Corp. v. 
Hacienda Franchise Group, Inc.,'O the franchisor terminated 
its franchisees for defaulting on royalty payments. According to 
the terms of the franchise agreement, the franchisor had the 
unilateral right to terminate the franchisees upon three de- 
faults in any eighteen-month period, without giving the fran- 
chisees notice or an opportunity to cure." The franchisees de- 
faulted by making three late royalty payments between Janu- 
ary and March 1990, approximately three months after their 
franchise-restaurant opened.12 In each instance the franchi- 
10. 569 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
11. Id. at 667. 
12. Id. at 665. 
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sees paid their royalties at least seven days later than the 
payment due date.13 When the third royalty payment was not 
timely paid, the franchisor notified the franchisees that their 
agreement was terminated because of the three defaults.14 
The franchisees brought their royalty payments current and 
continued operations; however, the franchisor sued and was 
granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the franchisees from 
operating the franchise-restaurant. l5 
On appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals, the franchisees 
claimed that termination for late royalty payments was an 
economic reason and thus not "good cause" as defined by the 
Indiana Deceptive Franchise Practices Act16 and as interpret- 
ed by the Seventh Circuit in Wright-Moore Corp. u. Ricoh 
Corp.'' The court, however, rejected the franchisees' argument 
and affirmed the injunction. The court recognized that the 
Indiana statute permitted contractual provisions allowing uni- 
lateral termination for good cause and that the statute did not 
limit good cause to material  violation^.'^ Without addressing 
whether the payment defaults were material violations, the 
court concluded that the franchise agreement did not permit 
termination absent good cause.lg 
The court then distinguished Wright-Moore's finding that 
the franchisor's internal economic reasons could not constitute 
good cause for termination. In Wright-Moore, the franchisee, 
Wright-Moore, had not breached its agreement with Ricoh; 
thus, Ricoh's decision to terminate Wright-Moore based on 
Ricoh's new marketing strategy did not fall within the statute's 
plain lang~age.'~ In Hacienda, the franchisees had breached 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. IND. CODE ANN. 5 23-2-2.7-l(7) (Burns 1989) states that it is unlawful for a 
franchise agreement to "[p]ermit[] unilateral termination of the franchise if such 
termination is without good cause or in bad faith. Good cause . . . includes any 
material violation of the franchise agreement." 
17. 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990). Ricoh refused to renew Wright-Moore's nation- 
al copier dealership agreement because of a change in Ricoh's marketing strategy 
to regional distributorships. The Seventh Circuit held that "the internal economic 
reasons of the franchisor are not, by themselves, good cause for termination or 
nonrenewal of a franchise." Id. at  137. Although Indiana Code 5 23-2-2.7-l(8) 
specifically addresses nonrenewals, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the case under 
8 23-2-2.7-l(7) which governs terminations, perhaps because 5 23-2-2.7-l(8) does not 
define good cause. 
18. Hacienda, 569 N.E.2d at 667. 
19. Id. 
20. Id.; see Wright-Moore, 908 F.2d at  138 ("[Tlhe statute may be limited 
7851 FRANCHISE TERMINATION 789 
the agreement by defaulting three times; "therefore [the fran- 
chisor] demonstrated that it  had properly terminated the fran- 
chise agreement.'"' 
The court's reasoning illustrates how good cause may be a n  
empty phrase which inadequately protects the franchisee's 
 interest^.'^ According to the court's reasoning, the statute al- 
lows the franchisor to define the standard for termination in  
the contract, a definition which the court will uphold if it meets 
the "good cause" test. Since good cause includes, but is not 
limited to, material violations, the court will conceivably never 
have to define materiality. Essentially the franchisor will be 
able to terminate its franchisee without judicial interference as 
long as the contract allows for termination when the franchisee 
fails to comply with a provision, regardless of its substance. 
The Indiana Court of Appeals seems to be permitting what the 
Seventh Circuit in Wright-Moore sought to prevent-tennina- 
tion for any business reason in the interest of the f r a n c h i ~ o r . ~ ~  
Thus, assuming that the purpose of the Indiana termination 
statute is to protect franchisees from unfair treatment by fran- 
c h i s o r ~ , ~ ~  franchisee protection under the statute is minimal. 
B. Illinois's Great American Cookie Case: 
Protecting the Franchisee 
Five months after the Indiana Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion in Hacienda, an Illinois federal district court was pre- 
sented with a similar question in Original Great American 
Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd.25 In 
this case, the franchise agreement allowed termination upon 
to . . . problems with the performance of the franchisee."). 
21. Hacienda, 569 N.E.2d at 667. 
22. Given the importance of timely payments to any business's cash flow, the 
court reached the correct result in Hacienda. However, its refusal to consider 
materiality does not establish a favorable precedent for franchisees. 
23. See Wright-Moore, 908 F.2d at 137-38. Some protection is afforded the 
franchisee because the grounds for unilateral termination must be contained in the 
contract. However, given the franchisor's ability to insist on contract terms favor- 
able to her position, the protection is limited. 
24. The Seventh Circuit in Wright-Moore acknowledged that Indiana's franchise 
law has no legislative history and that i t  interpreted Indiana's law by reference to 
the purposes behind similar laws in other states. The court referred to the Wis- 
consin Fair Dealership Law's purpose "to protect dealers against 'unfair treatment' 
from franchisors who 'inherently have superior economic power and superior bar- 
gaining power.' " Id. at  135 (citation omitted). 
25. 773 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
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three contractually defined material breaches, or defaults, dur- 
ing a twelve month period.26 One contractually defined default 
was failure to pay an invoice within ten days of its due date.27 
Great American issued two notices of default in February and 
June of 1990 for four invoices totalling approximately $12,350, 
which were 19, 35, 33, and 38 days overdue.2s The third de- 
fault, which triggered termination, occurred when an indepen- 
dent audit revealed that River Valley had underreported its 
sales during 1987 and 1988 by $40,551, resulting in additional ' 
royalties due Great American of $2,839.29 
Although River Valley promptly paid the additional royal- 
ties, Great American terminated its franchise in October 1990; 
however, River Valley continued t o  sell cookies, even when it 
ran out of Great American batter in February 1991.~~ Great 
American filed suit, alleging unauthorized use of its trademark 
and breach of contract. River Valley counterclaimed, alleging 
that Great American violated the Illinois Franchise Disclosure 
Act (IFDA)31 by improperly terminating its franchise.s2 Both 
parties sought preliminary injunctions, and the district court 
granted such relief to River Valley by ordering Great American 
to comply with the terms of the franchise agreement.3s 
In arriving at its decision, the court first analyzed River 
Valley's alleged repeated defaultss4 in light of the good cause 
26. Id. at 1125. 
27. Id. at 1126. 
28. Id. a t  1126-27, 1129. This figure does fiot include invoices for amounts 
under $100 which the court viewed as inconsequential. Id. a t  1129. 
29. Id. at 1125. 
30. Id. at 1124. 
31. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 121 U2, para. 1719 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991). Termina- 
tion of a franchise except for "good cause" violates the statute. "Good cause" is 
defined according to whether notice and an opportunity to cure a default is re- 
quired. In this case, the court applied qI 1719(c)(4): " 'Good cause' shall include, but 
without the requirement of notice and an  opportunity to cure, situations in which 
the franchisee . . . repeatedly fails to comply with the lawful provisions of the 
franchise or other agreement." 
32. Great American, 773 F. Supp. at 1124. 
33. Id. at 1130. 
34. Id. at 1127-29. In addition to the three financial defaults, Great American 
presented evidence of two other defaults. In 1989, River Valley failed to name 
Great American ?is an additional insured. However, because Great American offered 
River Valley an additional franchise eight months later, the court downplayed the 
event while stating that it  could be good cause. The second default concerned River 
Valley's failure to adhere to standards of cleanliness and product quality. While 
acknowledging that such failure would be grounds for termination, the court disre- 
garded the event because Great American had never notified River Valley that its 
operation fell below acceptable standards and constituted a default. Id. a t  1127. 
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standard interpreted in Dayan v. McDonald's C ~ r p . ~ ~  Dayan
"held that 'good cause' means 'failure to  substantially comply 
with obligations under the agreement' and centers on a 'deter- 
mination of commercial reasonability.' "36 The court first ap- 
plied the commercial reasonability standard t o  the $2,839 un- 
derpayment of royalties on sales in excess of $1 million over a 
three-year period, finding that the underreporting constituted 
one default instead of a default for each month the sales were 
~nderreported.~~ The court concluded that this underreporting 
could be a basis for "good cause" terminati~n.~' 
The court then evaluated the late invoice payments and 
declared that "a contract provision allowing a business to de- 
clare a default (potentially resulting in forfeiture of the entire 
business) for failure to pay an invoice within ten days is [not] 
commercially reas~nable."~~ Since the provision was commer- 
cially unreasonable, River Valley's two failures to  timely pay 
invoices could not constitute good cause for termination under 
the contract. Thus, with only two possible "good cause" bases4' 
left for termination, the court determined that River Valley 
would likely prevail on its claim that Great American's at- 
tempted termination of its franchise was without good cause in 
violation of the IFDA.41 
Great American illustrates the difference that a state's 
good cause definition makes. In Hacienda, the Indiana Court of 
Appeals permitted termination of the franchise relationship for 
three late royalty payments, but in Great American the federal 
district court found that ten-day late invoice payments were 
not good cause for termination under Illinois law. According to 
the Great American court, Indiana law allows good cause to 
include nonmaterial breaches whereas Illinois law, as inter- 
35. 466 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984). In Dayan, the Illinois Court of Appeals 
upheld McDonald's Corp.'s termination of Dayan's Paris franchises for noncompli- 
ance with the cleanliness and quality standards required by the franchise 
agreement. See id. at 976. 
36. Great American, 773 F. Supp. at 1128 (quoting Dayan, 466 N.E.2d a t  973). 
37. Id. at 1128-29. 
38. Id. at  1129. In determining the significance of the underreporting, the court 
also considered that only one small error had been found the year preceding the 
audit. Id. 
39. Id. The court determined that "Great American's draconian provision . . . is 
not even arguably reasonable" even though neither party presented any evidence 
regarding business practices in paying debts. Id. at  1129 all. 
40. The two bases were underpayment of royalties and failure to name Great 
American as an additional insured. See supra note 34. 
41. Id. at 1129. 
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preted by Dayan, limits good cause to material breaches.42 
Ironically, the IFDA did not apply to D ~ y a n ; ~ ~  nevertheless, 
federal courts applying Illinois law have continued to use 
Dayan's commercial reasonability test in the few cases litigat- 
ed.44 Also, in contrast to Indiana law, the federal courts' adop- 
tion of a commercially reasonable standard furthers the public 
policy of the IFDA "to protect the fran~hisee.'"~ This standard 
affords more protection to the franchisee than Indiana's defini- 
tion of good cause because the court may look to business prac- 
tices outside the contract's four comers to determine the fair- 
ness of the franchisor's actions. 
As shown by the cases in Section 11, a court's interpreta- 
tion of the good cause requirement necessarily focuses on the 
franchisee's failures and deficiencies under the franchise agree- 
ment. What happens when the franchisor's economic circum- 
stances, rather than the franchisee's performance, are the 
cause for termination? State statutes do not address those 
situations in which a franchisor terminates its franchisees 
because of a system-wide change in its marketing strategy or 
its withdrawal from a geographic market area.46 As might be 
expected when statutory guidance is unclear, the judicial opin- 
ions in the marketing strategy4? and market withdrawal48 
42. Id. at 1129 all. 
43. Dayan, 466 N.E.2d at 973. Although the Illinois legislature did not give the 
IFDA retroactive application, the IFDA was "relevant as an embodiment of applica- 
ble public policy" that a franchise may not be terminated unless good cause exists. 
Id. The court defined good cause in the course of resolving the actual issue on 
appeal, whether McDonald's Corp.'s termination violated the implied covenant of 
good faith. 
44. See Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706, 714 11.14 (7th Cir. 1985); P & 
W Supply Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 747 F. Supp. 1262, 1267-68 
(N.D. Ill. 1990). 
45. See, e.g., Dayan, 466 N.E.2d at 973. The legislature wanted to protect fran- 
chisees from long-standing abuses, particularly the franchisor's broad unilateral 
power of termination a t  will. Id. The court in Great American described the policy 
objectives as "prohibit[ing] franchisors from terminating franchisees without good 
cause." Great American, 773 F. Supp. at  1130. 
46. But cf. 15 U.S.C. $ 2802(b)(2)(E) (1988) (permitting franchisors "in good 
faith and in the normal course of business to withdraw from the marketing of 
motor fuel through retail outlets in the relevant geographic market area"). 
47. Cases which have found good cause requirements to be satisfied include: 
American Mart Corp. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 824 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(nationwide change to exclusive distributorships); Bimel-Walroth Co. v. Raytheon 
Co., 796 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1986) (nationwide combination of product line distribu- 
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cases lack uniformity. The lack of uniformity is best illustrated 
by the nationwide litigation following General Motors 
Corporation's 1986 decision to withdraw from the heavy duty 
truck market. The GMC opinions are particularly interesting 
because of their "contradictory interpretations of essentially 
similar factual and legal  question^.'"^ Following an examina- 
tion of the various GMC courts' reasonings, this section at- 
tempts to reconci1.e the conflicting results. 
A. Background of the GMC Cases 
General Motors Corporation (GMC) entered into agree- 
ments granting dealers the non-exclusive right to hold a dealer- 
ship out as an authorized GMC truck dealer and to buy trucks, 
parts, and accessories as described in the addenda attached to 
the agreement?' Each dealer signed separate addenda for dif- 
ferent truck models: light duty, medium duty, and heavy duty. 
GMC retained the right in the agreements to "discontinue any 
tors); Remus v. Amoco Oil Co., 794 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1986) (system-wide change 
to "discount for cash" program). Cases which have found good cause requirements 
inapplicable include East Bay Running Store, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 890 F.2d 996 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (system-wide change to "no mail order" policy). 
Cases which have found violations of good cause statutes include: Wright-Moore 
Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990) (system-wide change from 
national to regional distributorships); Solman Distribs. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 888 
F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1989) (change from exclusive distributorships); Carlos v. Philips 
Business Sys., 556 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(system-wide change from exclusive distributorships); Westfield Centre Serv. v. 
Cities Serv. Oil Co., 432 A.2d 48 (N.J. 1981) (sale of parcels of company-owned 
real estate statewide if the adjoining gas station was no longer economically 
feasible). 
48. See Medina & Medina v. Country Pride Foods, Ltd., 901 F.2d 181 (1st Cir. 
1990) (finding just cause for termination when franchisor withdrew from Puerto 
Rican market after parties could not agree on contract terms); Lee Beverage Co. v. 
I.S.C. Wines of Cal., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (finding good cause 
for termination when franchisor sold unprofitable product line); St. Joseph Equip. 
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1245 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (finding good cause 
for termination when franchisor withdrew from North American construction 
machinery market); Designs in Medicine, Inc. v. Xomed, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1054 
(E.D. Wis. 1981) (finding that Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law applied to franchisor 
withdrawing from state); cf. Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs. v. Walgreen 
Co., 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding violation of good cause requirement by 
franchisors who terminated franchisees while intending to increase the number of 
company-owned stores in the area). 
49. Freedman Truck Ctr. v. General Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 167, 170 
0.N.J. 1992). 
50. Unless otherwise indicated, this generalized statement of facts is taken from 
General Motors Corp. v. Gallo GMC Truck Sales, 711 F. Supp. 810, 811-12 (D.N.J. 
1989). 
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product at any time."51 
On August 15,1986, GMC signed a memorandum of under- 
standing with AB Volvo and its American subsidiaries, includ- 
ing Volvo White. The parties agreed to enter into a joint ven- 
ture, known as Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corporation. GMC was 
to withdraw from the North American heavy duty truck market 
as of January 1, 1987, and in GMC's place, Volvo GM would 
manufacture and market heavy duty trucks under the trade- 
mark 'White GMC." Both Volvo and GMC agreed to terminate 
their approximately 530 existing dealerships and to establish a 
new network of approximately 240 dealers, selecting one of 
their previous dealers where possible.52 
Between September and November 1986, GMC notified all 
of its dealers that production of its heavy duty trucks would be 
discontinued. If the dealer was not subsequently offered a 
Volvo GM franchise, GMC canceled its heavy duty truck adden- 
dum, effective December 31, 1987. GMC, however, did not 
cease to manufacture all of its heavy duty trucks. Pursuant to 
a contract with Volvo GM, GMC continued to manufacture one 
model, the Brigadier, for one year following its withdrawal 
from the heavy duty truck market. 
The plaintiffs in the resulting litigation were dealers who 
did not receive a franchise offer from Volvo GM. Each dealer 
brought suit alleging wrongful termination of a franchise53 
under state laws regulating motor vehicle dealerships; the only 
suits brought under a state general franchise relationship stat- 
ute were in New Jersey. 
B. Verdict: GMC Dealerships 
1. Wisconsin: GMC did not nondiscriminatorily withdraw 
from the market 
In Mid-State Truck Service v. General Motors Corp.," the 
51. Arthur Glick Truck Sales v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 494, 495 (2d 
Cir. 1989); Mid-State Truck Serv. v. General Motors Corp., No. 87-C995-S, 1988 
WL 148432, at  *3 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 1988), affd, 894 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1990). 
52. General GMC, Inc. v. Volvo White Truck Corp., [I987439 Transfer Binder] 
Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) qI 9178, a t  19,155 (D. Mass. 1987), reu'd in part, 918 
F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1990); C. Earl Brown, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 555 A.2d 314, 315- 
16 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 568 A.2d 1249 (Pa. 1989). 
53. Not only do the cases present issues involving termination for good cause, 
they also pose questions regarding the statutory definition of a franchise. For 
purposes of this comment, I will assume the dealers did have a separate franchise 
in heavy duty trucks. 
54. No. 87-(2995-S, 1988 WL 148432 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 1988), affd, 894 F.2d 
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district court granted Mid-State's motion for summary judg- 
ment, finding that GMC had canceled Mid-State's franchise in 
violation of Wisconsin law.55 GMC unsuccessfully argued that 
its complete nondiscriminatory withdrawal from the heavy duty 
truck market did not violate the statute.56 Although GMC had 
withdrawn from the market t o  the extent that it ceased manu- 
facturing three of the four heavy duty truck models listed in 
Mid-State's addendum, GMC had not totally withdrawn from 
the market because it continued to produce the Brigadier model 
- 
for sale by the joint venture? 
Although willing to  hold that GMC's nondiscriminatory 
product withdrawal did not violate the statute, the court found 
that GMC itself had not nondiscriminatorily withdrawn from 
the market.58 The court's finding relied entirely on GMC's con- 
tinued manufacture of the Brigadier The court then 
concluded that GMC's cancellation of Mid-State's franchise 
with respect to the Brigadier model was "unfair" and "without 
just provocation'' as defined by Wisconsin law?' In addition to 
granting Mid-State's summary judgment motion on its statuto- 
ry claim, the court entered an injunction requiring Volvo GM to  
continue Mid-State's franchise in the Brigadier model.61 
2. Maine: Extent of GMCs participation in joint venture 
raises questions 
In C-B Kenworth, Inc. v. General Motors C ~ r p . , ~ ~  the court 
denied GMC's motion for summary judgment on Kenworth's 
claims that GMC's termination of its franchise violated the 
Maine Motor Vehicle Dealer's Act.63 The Act prohibits termi- 
1339 (7th Cir. 1990). 
55. WIS. STAT. ANN. 8 218.01(3)(a)17 (1982) provides that an automobile 
distributor's license, may be suspended or revoked for canceling a dealer's franchise 
"unfairly, without due regard to the equities of said dealer and without just 
provocation." 
56. Mid-State, 1988 WL 148432 at  *8. 
57. Id. at  *9. 
58. Id. 
59. In fad, GMC's reasons for canceling its dealers' franchises and entering 
into the joint venture with Volvo were deemed "immaterial." Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at  *12. 
62. 706 F. Supp. 952 (D. Me. 1988). 
63. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, $ 1174 (West Supp. 1981). Kenworth alleged 
six violations of various provisions of the Maine Act. Two provisions of the A d  
prohibit termination of a franchise unless the manufacturer a d s  in good faith. 
Although good faith and good cause are similar, this comment focuses only on the 
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nation absent good cause and provides that good cause exists 
when "the manufacturer discontinues production or distribution 
of the franchise p r o d ~ c t . ' ~ ~  GMC argued that it fulfilled the 
good cause requirement because it discontinued production and 
distribution of its heavy duty trucks when it entered into the 
joint venture with Volvo White.65 
Kenworth, however, disputed GMC's claim, alleging that 
GMC had continued t o  manufacture the Brigadier as well as 
perform warranty work on and make parts for heavy duty 
trucks. Kenworth also claimed that because GMC exercised 
significant control over the joint venture, it had not "departed 
from the heavy duty truck market."66 While acknowledging 
that it continued t o  make the Brigadier, GMC claimed it still 
had departed from the market because the joint venture, which 
GMC denied controlling, marketed the Brigadier and its parts. 
The court rejected GMC's argument, finding that Kenworth had 
introduced enough evidence to raise a genuine factual question 
on whether GMC had good cause to terminate its franchi~e.~? 
3. New York: GMC's incomplete market withdrawal raises 
genuine questions 
In Arthur Glick Truck Sales v. General Motors Corp.,B8 
the Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summa- 
ry judgment t o  General Motors. The district court found that 
"no franchise had been terminated" by reasoning that the stat- 
ute did not require a franchisor to continue manufacturing an 
unprofitable product line because commerce would be adversely 
affected.69 The Second Circuit characterized this rationale as 
"purely economic" and criticized the district court for failing t o  
consider that heavy duty trucks might constitute a separate 
franchise under New York law." The district court also failed 
to account for GMC's continuing manufacture of the successful 
Brigadier model for marketing by the joint venture.?' 
provision requiring good cause. 
64. Title 10, 9 1174(3)(P)(4). 
65. C-B Kenworth, 706 F. Supp. at 956. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. 865 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1989). 
69. Id. at 497. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. The Second Circuit in its statement of facts noted that in 
Brigadier model accounted for 71.52% of GMC's heavy duty truck sales 
1987 the 
and that 
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Since the district court found no franchise termination, it 
did not reach the question of whether GMC had terminated 
Glick's franchise without due cause in violation of the Fran- 
chised Motor Dealer Vehicle The Second Circuit found 
that there were genuine issues of fact regarding GMC's termi- 
nation of Glick's franchise, given its incomplete market with- 
drawal. However, the court did not provide any guidelines as to 
which, if any, of GMC's reasons for termination would consti- 
tute due cause.73 
4. New Jersey, Round 1: GMCs market withdrawal violates 
statute per se 
In General Motors Corp. u. Gallo GMC Truck Sales,74 a 
federal district court granted Gallo's motion for summary judg- 
ment on its claim that GMC's termination of its franchise 
lacked good cause under the New Jersey Franchise Practice Act 
(NJFPA).75 The court, interpreting the plain language of the 
statute, held that the only "good cause" for termination is the 
franchisee's failure to substantially comply with the terms of 
the franchise agreement; the franchisor's actions in good faith 
or for bona fide economic reasons do not absolve it of liability 
under the 
The court supported its interpretation of the NJFPA by 
referring to other New Jersey court decisions7? and the 
NJFPA7s purpose. The legislature, recognizing past abuse of 
the franchise relationship through the franchisor's superior 
bargaining position, sought to prevent arbitrary termination of 
 franchisee^.^' Because there was no good faith exception in 
the Brigadier had more than a 30% share of its segment of the heavy duty truck 
market. Id. at  496. 
72. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW 5 463(2)(d)(l) (McKimey 1986) states that "[i]t 
shall be unlawful for any franchisor to terminate, cancel or refuse to renew the 
franchise of any franchised motor vehicle dealer except for due cause, regardless of 
the terms of the franchise." Due cause is not defined in the Act. 
73. Arthur Glick, 865 F.2d at  498. 
74. 711 F. Supp. 810 (D.N.J. 1989). 
75. N.J. STAT. ANN. 8 56:lO-5 (West 1989). Good cause is "limited to failure by 
the franchisee to substantially comply with those requirements imposed upon him 
by the franchise." Id. 
76. Gallo, 711 F. Supp. a t  816. 
77. See Westfield Centre Sew. v. Cities Sew. Oil Co., 432 A.2d 48 (N.J. 1981); 
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Q u i ~ ,  362 A.2d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976); 
Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598 (NJ. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 
(1974). 
78. Gallo, 711 F. Supp. at  814. 
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the statute, the court concluded that "it was not the intent of 
the New Jersey legislature to protect the business interests of 
the franchiser [sic]."7g Given the NJFPA's purpose and its lim- 
itation of good cause to substantial breaches by the franchisee, 
the court found that GMC's termination of Gallo's franchise 
due to its withdrawal from the heavy duty truck market lacked 
good cause. 
C. Verdict: GMC 
1. Massachusetts: Volvo White had "sound economic reasons" 
In General GMC, Inc. v. Volvo White Truck C~rp . ,~ '  Gen- 
eral GMC's request for a temporary restraining order enjoining 
Volvo White from terminating its dealership was denied. The 
court found that Volvo White had good cause for termination 
under Massachusetts law8' because of "legitimate business 
reasons"-it would have been defunct by January 1, 1988 .~~  
The court also explained that Massachusetts law did not pre- 
vent a manufacturer from making business decisions 
"predicated on sound economic  reason^."^ Although the court 
did not elaborate on the economic reason behind the formation 
of the Volvo WhiteIGMC joint venture, it was probably refer- 
ring to Volvo White's difficulty in competing profitably in the 
American heavy duty truck market.84 
79. Id. at 818. 
80. [I98749 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) ql 9178, at 19,153 
(D. Mass. 1987), rev'd in part, 918 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1990). Following General 
GMC's defeat on its motion for a temporary restraining order, the district court 
granted Volvo White summary judgment. The First Circuit reversed summary 
judgment with respect to General GMC's state statutory claim that Volvo White 
acted in bad faith when it considered General GMC for a Volvo GM dealership. 
918 F.2d at  308-09. Since the subsequent case history does not concern Volvo 
White's withdrawal from the market, this section discusses only General GMC's 
motion for a temporary restraining order. 
General GMC was a dealer for Volvo's American subsidiary, Volvo White: 
except for the defendant's name, the facts in the text accompanying notes 50-53 
are the same. Besides GMC's Brigadier model, Volvo GM also had plans to sell 
one of the two existing heavy duty Volvo White models under the joint venture. 
[1987-89 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) a t  19,155. 
81. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93B, 8 4(3)(e) (1984). Termination of a motor vehicle 
dealer's franchise without good cause is an unfair or deceptive a d  and is unlawful. 
Id. Section 4(3)(e)(4) requires the court to consider "all pertinent circumstances" in 
determining whether good cause has been established. 
82. General GMC, [1987-89 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) at  
19,156. 
83. Id. at 19,157. 
84. Id. at  19,155. Volvo White had only a 10% share of this highly competitive 
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The court's analysis of good cause focused on Volvo GM's 
selection of franchisees for the new joint venture. Volvo GM's 
decision to terminate General GMC's franchise was based on 
the change in product lines as well as an assessment of the 
area's inability to support multiple dea l e r~h ips .~~  The court 
characterized this "legitimate business decision'' as a change i n  
the "channels of distribution" which "an automobile manufac- 
turer has an unqualified right to make? These legitimate 
business reasons, supported by Volvo White's defunct status, 
met the good cause requirement. 
2. Pennsylvania: GMCs motives for joint venture constituted 
'good cause" 
In C. Earl Brown, Inc. v.  commonwealth^' the court af- 
firmed the finding of the State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, 
Dealers and Salespersons (Board) that General Motors did not 
violate the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles ActS8 when it with- 
drew from the heavy duty truck market. Brown argued that 
GMC had not exited the heavy duty truck industry but merely 
continued its operations in a different corporate form.'' The 
court refused to follow Brown's argument that anything less 
than a total cessation of business violates the Act because the 
Act itself allows a manufacturer to prove that its termination 
decision was for good cause and in good faith." 
Because of the "good faith and good cause" language, the 
Board examined GMC's motives for termination. The Board 
found that GMC's initial decision to form the joint venture was 
made for good cause "because [GMC] was rapidly losing its 
market share and could not afford to make the large capital 
investments that would be required to build its position."' 
market. Id. 
85. Id. at 19,156. 
86. Id. 
87. 555 A.2d 314 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 568 A.2d 1249 (Pa. 1989). 
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, 8 818.9(c) (Supp. 1984) (amended 1991) provides 
that a manufacturer violates the Act when it cancels a vehicle dealer's franchise 
"unfairly, without due regard to the equities of said dealer and without just 
provocation." Prior to 1991, the section also provided that if a dealer appeals its 
termination to the State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons, 
the manufacturer had the burden "to show that such termination . . . was for good 
cause and in good faith." Id. 
89. Brown, 555 A.2d at 316. 
90. Id. at 316-17. 
91. Id. a t  317. The Board had found that GMC's market share in 1985 was 
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The Board also found good faith because neither GMC's nor 
Volvo's conduct was dishonest.92 The court acknowledged that 
i t  was difficult, if not impossible, to separate GMC's joint ven- 
ture decision from its resulting decision to terminate Brown's 
f r a n ~ h i s e . ~ ~  Therefore, given that GMC's initial decision to 
form the joint venture was for good cause and in good faith, the 
court sustained the Board's finding that Brown's franchise had 
not been illegally terminated.94 
3. North Carolina: GMCs discontinuance of product line 
constituted "good cause" 
In Carolina Truck & Body Co. v. General Motors C ~ r p . ? ~  
the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the determination 
by the North Carolina Commissioner of Motor Vehicles that 
GMC terminated Carolina Truck's franchise for good cause and 
in good faith under North Carolina law.g6 Since the statute 
limits good cause in part to a dealer's failure to comply with 
the contract, it appears that a manufacturer's market with- 
drawal is not good cause for termination. Therefore, in order to 
find good cause for GMC's actions, the court had to look beyond 
the statutory lang~age.~ '  
The court began by noting that the "good cause" section, 
20-305(6), cross-references and  includes section 20- 
305(6)(c)(l)(IV), which defines the notification period for termi- 
nation as 180 days "where the manufacturer or distributor is 
discontinuing the sale of the product line.'*8 Interpreting the 
statute in pari materia, the court held that "the statute. . . 
provides that a manufacturer may cancel a franchise if discon- 
tinuing the sale of the product line and that this action is for 
down to 8.7%. Id. at 315. 
92. Id. at  317. 
93. Id. The termination decisions were described as being "part of a comprehen- 
sive and carefully studied scheme to ensure adequate representation throughout the 
country while also ensuring adequate dealer profits." Id. 
94. Id. 
95. 402 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 407 S.E.2d 831 (N.C. 1991). 
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. $ 20-305(6) (1983) provides that termination is unlawful 
unless the manufacturer provides notice and the Commissioner, if requested by the 
dealer, finds that there is good cause for termination and that the manufacturer 
has acted in good faith. Good cause is defined in 8 20-305(6)(a)(l) as "a failure by 
the new motor vehicle dealer to comply with a provision of the franchise which is 
both reasonable and of material significance to the franchise relationship." 
97. Carolina Truck, 402 S.E.2d at  137-38. 
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. $ 20-305(6)(c)(l)(IV) (1983). 
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'good cause.' "" Furthermore, the court refused to believe that 
the North Carolina legislature would "require a manufacturer 
to continue on a road to certain bankruptcy by requiring the 
manufacturer to continue t o  make and sell unprofitable models 
of cars or trucks."loO 
After finding that discontinuance of a product line is good 
cause for termination, the court concluded that the evidence 
documenting GMC's loss of profits in the heavy duty truck 
market supported the trial court's finding of good ca~se. '~'  It 
further found that GMC terminated Carolina Truck's franchise 
in good faith because GMC did not act dishonestly, GMC gave 
Carolina Truck a year's notice, and GMC treated Carolina 
Truck the same as its other heavy duty truck franchisees.lo2 
4. Maryland: GMC did not abuse its superior bargaining 
position 
In Central GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,lo3 the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's $2 million award to 
Central GMC for wrongful termination under Maryland 
law.lo4 Although the Fourth Circuit reversed on the grounds 
that the separate addenda did not constitute a franchise,lo5 
the court discussed the purpose of the Maryland statute and its 
application to GMC's withdrawal from the heavy duty truck 
market. 
The court first considered the Maryland Act's purpose to  
prevent " 'frauds, discrimination and other abuses' in the 
manufactureddealer relationship."'" Clearly the statute in- 
tended to prevent domineering behavior by the franchisor be- 
cause of its greater bargaining power. Central argued that 
GMC's joint venture was an illegal abuse of power because 
GMC had not withdrawn from the market-GMC continued t o  
99. Carolina Truck, 402 S.E.2d at  138. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. The trial court described GMC's nationwide withdrawal as a "reasonable 
and justifiable business decision." Id. a t  136. 
102. Id. at 138. 
103. 946 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S .  Ct. 1265 (1992). 
104. MD. TRANSP. CODE A m .  § 15-209(a)(1) (1987) states that a manufacturer 
may not terminate a dealer's franchise unless "the dealer has failed to comply 
substantially with the reasonable requirements of the franchise." The statute does 
not make an exception for actions in good faith or for good cause. 
105. "GMC has discontinued a product but has not terminated a franchise." 
Central GMC, 946 F.2d at 332. 
106. Id. (citation omitted). 
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manufacture the Brigadier for a year after its supposed with- 
drawal. As further proof of GMC's market presence, Central 
pointed to "the inclusion of 'GMC' in the brand name of the 
joint venture's trucks; . . . mandatory compatibility of the joint 
venture's truck engines and transmissions with those produced 
by a General Motors division; and GMC's right to elect a por- 
tion of the joint venture's board of  director^."'^' GMC re- 
sponded with facts that demonstrated its limited participation 
in the joint venture.lo8 The court refused to resolve the 
"hornet's nest" because GMC's decision to  cease producing 
heavy duty trucks was a "legitimate, lawful reaction . . . to 
unfavorable10g market conditions" and was not "an abuse of 
superior bargaining power" which ran afoul of the Maryland 
statute's purpose. 'lo 
The court then considered the statute's second purpose: 
"fostering 'vigorous and healthy competition' in the motor vehi- 
cle industry.""' If Central were to win, it would "guarantee 
franchisees protection from any downturn in the market while 
denying franchisors the ability to  react to  that same market by 
compelling them to pay a substantial penalty to dealers for 
discontinuing any unprofitable product line."ll2 The court was 
unwilling to infer that the Maryland legislature intended to 
make owning a franchise risk-free? The court reasoned that 
competition is improved, and the public, including the franchi- 
see, is benefitted when franchisors are allowed to  respond to 
changing market conditions by reinvesting assets. ' l4 Thus, 
requiring GMC to pay damages for terminating an unprofitable 
product line would not further the Maryland statute's purpose. 
107. Id. at 333. 
108. For example, Volvo owned 76% of the joint venture's stock and controlled 
seven of the ten seats on the board of directors. Volvo controlled the daily opera- 
tions of the joint venture, and the joint venture had its own management team 
and manufacturing facilities. Id. 
109. The court noted that by 1985 GMC had become "the smallest of the seven 
major [heavy duty truck] industry competitors within the United States* and its 
market share had declined by almost half in four years. Id. at 329. 
110. Id. at 333. 
111. Id. (citation omitted). 
112. Id. at 333-34. 
113. Id at 334. 
114. Id. 
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5. New Jersey, Round 2: Gallo's rationale rejected, but 
questions remain 
Three years following Gallo,l15 a second federal district 
court in New Jersey was presented with the same issue in 
Freedman Truck Center v. General Motors Corp.ll6 However, 
this court rejected Gallo's holding that  every general market 
withdrawal violates the NJFPA."' The court began by noting 
that the NJFPA's legislative history documented witnesses' 
testimony about " 'capricious action by franchisors . . . [who] re- 
fus[ed] to renew one successful franchise in order to give that 
business opportunity to a more favored entrepreneur.' "lls 
From these statements the court concluded that the legislature 
apparently had not addressed general market withdrawal by 
the franchisor. 'lg 
Next, the court considered the principal case relied on by 
Gallo, Westfield Centre Service v. Cities Service Oil Co., which 
held that the NJFPA was violated unless the franchisee sub- 
stantially breached its 0b1igations.l~~ In Westfield, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court found that Cities Service violated the 
NJFPA when, as part of its evaluation of its New Jersey hold- 
ings, it terminated Westfield's franchise because a gas station 
was no longer economically feasible at that 10cation.l~~ The 
Freedman court distinguished Westfield on the basis that the 
franchisor in Westfield had not completely withdrawn from the 
market and the franchisor had served its own interests a t  the 
expense of its franchisee because of its stronger bargaining 
p0siti0n.l~~ In contrast, a total market withdrawal would not 
present an opportunity for such abuses. The franchisor "cannot 
appropriate the goodwill of a terminated dealer by diverting its 
business to favored franchisees," nor is there any possibility of 
"the franchisor driving an unconscionably hard bargain" be- 
cause there is no bargain to be made? This reasoning led 
115. General Motors Corp. v. Gallo Truck Sales, 711 F. Supp. 810 (D.N.J. 1989); 
see supra part III.B.4. 
116. 784 F. Supp. 167 (D.N.J. 1992). 
117. Id. at 173. 
118. Id. at 170 (citation omitted). 
119. Id. 
120. 432 A.2d 48, 57 (N.J. 1981). 
121. Id. at 51-52. , 
122. Freedman, 784 F .  Supp. at 171. 
123. Id. at 172. 
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the Freedman court to reject Gallo's holding that market with- 
drawal violates the NJFPA per se. 
However, because of the way in which GMC exited the 
New Jersey market, the court did not grant GMC's motion to 
dismiss on the good cause issue. First, GMC continued produc- 
tion of the Brigadier for one year following its termination of 
Freedman's franchise, and it offered the truck to some former 
franchisees. Presuming the heavy duty truck was a franchise, 
the court found the facts presented a triable issue on whether 
GMC had discriminatorily terminated Freedman's franchise 
without the defense of market withdrawal.lZ4 
Second, despite its departure from manufacturing heavy 
duty trucks, GMC still presewed a market presence through 
the survival of its tradename and through the former GMC 
dealers who were offered new franchises by the joint venture. 
The court reasoned: 
To the extent that the chosen franchisees sold substantially 
the same products to substantially the same markets with 
which GM franchisees had formerly done business, and there- 
by derived a benefit from goodwill already associated with the 
GM name, they would be free-riding on the efforts of all for- 
mer GM franchisees . . . . Such an uncompensated appropria- 
tion of the labor and capital of terminated franchisees would 
be made possible by the superior bargaining position of the 
fran~hisor.'~~ 
If this had occurred, the court believed that GMC would have 
violated the good cause provisions under the NJFPA. 
D. Reconciling the Irreconcilable: 
The GMC Opinions 
In essence, the dealers in the above cases were successful 
when the courts focused on GMC's continued production of the 
Brigadier. The courts in  Wisconsin, Maine, New York, and New 
~ e r s e y ' ~ ~  all found triable factual issues on whether GMC in 
fact withdrew from the heavy duty truck market while still 
manufacturing the Brigadier for the joint venture. Maine, New 
York, and New Jerseylz7 also considered GMC's withdrawal 
124. Id. at 173. 
125. Id. at 173-74. 
126. See discussion supra parts III.B.l, III.B.2, III.B.3, III.C.5. 
127. See discussion supra parts III.B.2, III.B.3, III.C.5. 
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to present triable issues because GMC had some control over 
the joint venture and because GMC's trademark remained 
visible by its incorporation in the joint venture's name. 
Rather than focusing on GMC's continued market pres- 
ence, the courts in which GMC or Volvo White received favor- 
able rulings focused on GMC's motives for forming the joint 
venture. The Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and North Caroli- 
na128 courts did not mention the Brigadier in  their analysis 
but discussed GMC's need to reverse its declining market 
share. The only court in which GMC won that acknowledged 
the issues involving the Brigadier and GMC's control over the 
joint venture was the Fourth Circuit, interpreting Maryland 
law.12' The Fourth Circuit emphasized GMC's formation of 
the joint venture as a lawful response to unfavorable market 
conditions and chose to leave unresolved the issues of the 
Brigadier and continued market participation through the joint 
venture. With regard to GMC's poor financial prospects and its 
limited choices, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning was similar to 
that of the Pennsylvania and North Carolina courts. The Mas- 
sachusetts decision is an anomaly because the court focused on 
Volvo GM's selection of dealers for the new joint venture rather 
than its continued production of Volvo White models or its 
reasons for forming the joint venture. 
To some extent, the court's focus is dictated by the statuto- 
ry definitions of good cause.130 The Massachusetts and Penn- 
sylvania statutes encourage a judicial inquiry into the 
manufacturer's motives; Massachusetts directs the court to 
consider "all pertinent circumstances," and Pennsylvania ex- 
empts terminations made in "good faith."131 Given the man- 
date to consider motive, the result in favor of GMC is not sur- 
prising. In contrast, the Wisconsin and New Jersey statutes 
define good cause according to the dealer's circumstances; Wis- 
consin considers termination in light of the equities of the deal- 
er, and New Jersey limits good cause to substantial breaches 
by the dealer.ls2 Since both statutes disregard the  
manufacturer's circumstances, the findings in favor of the deal- 
128. See discussion supra parts III.C.l, III.C.2, III.C.3. 
129. See discussion supra part III.C.4. 
130. The following discussion omits any reference to the Maine or New York 
statutes because the cases were decided on summary judgment without any inter- 
pretation of the good cause standard. 
131. See supra notes 81 and 88. 
132. See supra notes 55 and 75. 
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ers by the Wisconsin court and the New Jersey court in Gallo 
are not unexpected. 
What is unexpected, perhaps, is GMC's success in Mary- 
land and North Carolina given that their statutesls3 are sub- 
stantively identical to New Jersey's. The North Carolina and 
Maryland courts, as well as the New Jersey court in Freedman, 
looked beyond the statutory language to the economic realities 
of GMC's situationls4 and the policies underlying the stat- 
utes. New Jersey and Maryland enacted legislation to prevent 
the manufacturer from abusing its stronger bargaining position 
and from appropriating its dealers' good ~ i 1 l . l ~  Economic re- 
structuring by complete market withdrawal did not present a 
situation in which the manufacturer could abuse its position or 
appropriate its dealers' good will because no dealer would exist 
to whom it could divert business. 
However, despite similar statutory policies, the Maryland 
and New Jersey courts reached contrary results because each 
court characterized GMC's actions differently. The Maryland 
court found that GMC did withdraw from the market because 
it canceled all of its heavy duty truck addenda.136 Further- 
more, GMC's participation in the joint venture was not an issue 
because it was a legitimate response to changing market condi- 
tions. In contrast, the New Jersey court in Freedman consid- 
ered GMC's actions d t e r  its cancellation of the heavy duty 
truck addenda. The court found that GMC's market withdrawal 
may not have been complete since the joint venture dealers, 
chosen from former GMC and Volvo White dealers, were selling 
substantially the same products to the same market.ls7 In 
this situation, the new dealers could free ride on the efforts of 
the terminated dealer to establish a local market for GMC's 
heavy duty trucks. In effect, GMC may have appropriated its 
former dealer's good will because of its bargaining power, an 
action contrary to the statute's purpose. 
133. See supra notes 96 and 104. 
134. At the time GMC announced its participation in the joint venture, the 
heavy duty truck market was changing due to "decreases in demand, deregulation 
of the trucking industry, increased international competition, and excess manufac- 
turing capacity." Central GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 946 F.2d 327, 334 
(4th Cir. 1991). In response to these conditions, GMC could have liquidated its 
heavy duty truck division or invested its assets in the joint venture. Id. at 333. 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14 and 115-23. 
136. Central GMC, 946 F.2d at 333. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The protection afforded by franchise relationship statutes 
is heavily dependent on the good cause definition, as shown by 
Hacienda and Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie. 
These cases also demonstrate how the good cause definition 
limits protection to only the franchisee's interests, given the 
underlying public policy of equalizing the parties' bargaining 
positions. 
This approach, however, overlooks the mutual benefit and 
dependency inherent in the franchise relationship. The franchi- 
sor has invested time, energy, and capital into establishing a 
reliable reputation for her product or service among the public; 
the franchisee has invested time, energy, and capital into build- 
ing a business.138 Both parties enter the relationship expect- 
ing t o  achieve economic benefits. However, when the economic 
benefits diminish to the point that the franchisor wishes t o  
withdraw from the market, it finds no equivalent statutory 
protection. The General Motors case study reveals how the 
current good cause standards fail to  account for the franchisor's 
need to initiate changes in its marketing activities t o  respond 
to changing market conditions and consumer preferences. Thus, 
given some statutes' lack of protection for the franchisor, state 
legislatures should redraft the good cause definition to  effect a 
balance between the franchisor's business needs and the 
franchisee's interest in continuing the franchise. 
Rose Marie Reynolds 
138. See generally ,Martin D. Fern & Philip I .  Klein, Restrictions on Termination 
and Nonrenewal of Franchises: A Policy Analysis, 36 BUS. LAW. 1041 (1981). 
